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In this paper, we show how managing a durable goods channel is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
managing a channel for non-durables. Although both channels have to deal with the problem
of coordination, the durable goods manufacturer also has to deal with the problem of time-
consistency. We show that the standard contracts that coordinate a channel for non-durables
do not coordinate the channels for durables.
Focusing on the marketing of durables, we explore whether the idea of “selling the ﬁrm” to
the retailer ensures channel coordination. When the manufacturer oﬀers per-period two-part
tariﬀs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost, we ﬁnd that not only does this
contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity than an
integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization
problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell.
Using a more general two-part tariﬀ contract, we show that the manufacturer can achieve
channel coordination. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the ﬁrst period is strictly
above the marginal cost. Next, we derive a contract that solves both the channel coordination
and time consistency problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer
writes a contract with the retailer specifying a ﬁx e df e ea n dt w op e r - p e r i o dw h o l e s a l ep r i c e s ,
both of which turn out to be strictly above the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract,
the manufacturer makes higher proﬁts by selling through the retailer than selling directly to
consumers.
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Most manufacturers do not have their own retail outlets and instead rely on intermediaries
to sell their products to end users. For example, auto manufacturers use independent dealers
and PC manufacturers sell through large retailers such as Best Buy or CompUSA. In dealing
with intermediaries, manufacturers have to solve the problem of coordinating the channel –
that is, ensuring that the downstream players take actions that the manufacturer would like
them to take. Although this problem is well known and has been studied extensively, the
focus has been on coordinating channels for nondurable products. However, it is not clear if
the solution to the coordination problem for nondurables should also apply to durables. In
particular, unlike nondurables, manufacturers and retailers of durables have to contend with
potential competition from a secondary market – consumers always have the option of buying
used cars instead of new ones. The basic question we address in this paper is as follows: In the
case of durable products, how should a manufacturer structure its contract with the retailer so
that it can coordinate the channel and manage the competition from the secondary market?
In the process, we show how the coordination problem in distribution channels for durable
products is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the standard coordination problem for non-durables.
In a channel that consists of multiple decision-makers, the coordination problem arises
because, each decision-maker owns and operates a part of the channel and makes decisions that
optimize its own proﬁt. Such selﬁsh optimization behavior leads to uncoordinated decisions
in that they are not optimal either for the other decision-maker or for the whole distribution
channel. For example, the retailer may choose a price that maximizes its own proﬁt, but
generally that uncoordinated price is not the best price from the manufacturer’s or from the
channel’s point of view. A large literature in economics and marketing studies a manufacturer’s
problem of designing contracts that give the retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions
that align, or coordinate, the retailer’s and manufacturer’s goals (see, for example, Spengler
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1995, Desai 1997, among others). For example, a manufacturer can coordinate the channel by
c h o o s i n gat w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ in which the wholesale price is set at the manufacturer’s marginal
cost and the ﬁxed fee extracts all the proﬁts over the minimum amount needed to retain the
participation of the retailer. Said diﬀerently, the manufacturer can solve the coordination
problem by selling the ﬁrm to the retailer at a price equal to the ﬁxed fee. This can also
be thought of as making the retailer the residual claimant to the channel proﬁts. When the
retailer is the residual claimant, then it has the appropriate incentives to choose a price (or
other decision variable) that maximizes the channel’s proﬁts.
Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the
coordination issue for durable goods that have the added complexity of competition from used
goods in secondary markets. In particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only
the channel coordination problem but also the time-consistency problem. We develop a dynamic
model to analyze the eﬀect of several diﬀerent types of contracts in solving the coordination
and time consistency problems. In particular, we investigate whether the strategy of selling
the ﬁrm to the retailer can solve either the coordination or the time-consistency problem.
Importantly, we derive a relatively simple contract that solves both these problems, and ﬁnd
that an integrated manufacturer can increase its proﬁts if it markets its product through a
retailer.
The coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer, principally because of the
competition between used and new goods. In particular, suppose a ﬁrm sells a certain quantity
of a durable to consumers. Having sold this initial quantity, the ﬁrm still faces a residual
demand for the good, consisting of those consumers who place a value on the good lower than
the current market price. As a result, the ﬁrm has an incentive to lower its price to attract
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until the ﬁrm lowers price to its marginal cost of production. However, from a consumer’s
perspective, each time the ﬁrm lowers price, it also lowers the “value” of the product that the
consumer had purchased at a higher price in an earlier period. Thus, rational consumers would
factor in future price reductions into their current willingness to pay. Coase (1972) conjectured
that if the ﬁrm were to exploit residual demand in future periods, then rational consumers would
anticipate this behavior and price would fall to the competitive level in the “twinkling of an
eye.” Thus, the net eﬀect of product durability and rationality on the part of consumers is that
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are reduced. Further research in this area has formalized Coase’s conjecture
(e.g., Bulow 1982; Stokey 1981) and pointed out conditions under which it does not hold, e.g.,
if there is a constant inﬂow of new customers (Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel 1984), if the good
depreciates (Bond and Samuelson 1984), or if the ﬁrm has increasing marginal production costs
(Kahn 1986).
The central problem with durables arises because once a manufacturer sells a unit it is no
longer interested in what happens to the value of that unit. Thus, by lowering prices for new
products over time, the ﬁrm also lowers the value of old units owned by consumers. However,
as argued previously, rational consumers would anticipate this behavior and force the ﬁrm to
lower prices immediately. As a result, the only way for the ﬁrm to maintain a higher price level
is if it can convince consumers that it will not lower prices over time. Even though ex ante
(at the time of initial sales), the ﬁrm prefers to make such a promise, ex post (after consumers
have bought the product), it would prefer to break the promise. Thus, the ﬁrm’s preferences
are not time consistent and consumers would not believe any promises made by the ﬁrm. A
promise would be credible only if it were a legally binding commitment, for example, through
a contract with individual consumers.1 However, such a strategy may be undesirable because
1Alternatively, the manufacturer could break the molds, thus ensuring that no additional products can be
produced.
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possible solution is for the ﬁrm to rent, rather than sell the product to consumers. When the
ﬁrm rents the product, it retains the ownership of used units, and therefore, has an incentive
to keep the price of used units high. However, renting is not entirely free from problems
such as the possibility of consumers potentially abusing the product and the additional costs
of marketing the product for subsequent rentals. In addition, renting may also have the added
cost of writing legal contracts with individual consumers.
When we add a distribution channel to durables, the problem becomes further exacerbated.
Now, not only does the manufacturer have to contend with issues related to time-consistency,
but it also has to write a contract that helps it solve the problem of channel coordination.
And the channel coordination problem itself is more complex because of the inter-temporal
linkages we discussed earlier. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrst-period decisions aﬀect second-period outcomes,
and this eﬀect may be diﬀerent for the retailer than for an integrated seller. As a consequence,
the channel coordination for durable goods presents challenges not faced by non-durable goods
manufacturers. While some of these issues have been explored in Purohit (1995), the general
problem of coordinating a durable goods distribution channel has not been addressed. This
paper analyzes diﬀerent contracts and evaluates their ability to solve the coordination and
time-consistency problems. We develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer
sells its products to a retailer who sells the product to consumers. Products sold in the ﬁrst
period become used goods in the second period and compete with sales of new units. Starting
from consumer utilities, we build inverse demand functions for new and used goods and consider
an u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer. Some of our key
ﬁndings are as follows.
• Given the well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we
begin with a contract in which the manufacturer oﬀers per-period two-part tariﬀsi n
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this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity
than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double
marginalization problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated
manufacturer would sell.
• In contrast to the ﬁndings in the non-durable goods literature, we ﬁnd that the strategy
of selling the ﬁrm to the retailer is not an equilibrium outcome.
• We ﬁnd that a particular two-part tariﬀ can coordinate the supply chain. However, this
contract involves the manufacturer charging a wholesale price strictly greater than its
marginal cost in the ﬁrst-period, and charging a wholesale price equal to its marginal
cost in the second period. Although, this contract solves the coordination problem, it
does not solve the time-consistency problem – the total distribution channel proﬁts with
this contract are the same as an integrated manufacturer’s proﬁtw h e ni tsells directly to
consumers.
• We show that by pre-committing to a two-part contract that covers both periods, the
manufacturer can do better by going through a retailer than selling the product directly
to consumers. When the manufacturer employs this contract, the total channel proﬁts
are identical to the channel proﬁts when the manufacturer rents i t sp r o d u c t sd i r e c t l y
to consumers. These are the highest level of proﬁts that a durable goods distribution
channel can achieve – either by renting or by selling. Said diﬀerently, this contract
solves not only the coordination problem, but also the time-consistency problem.
We contribute to the coordination literature by showing that the inter-temporal linkage in
the durable good’s market changes the channel coordination problem. In addition to the double
marginalization problem, the manufacturer also faces the problem of inducing the retailer to
appropriately consider the competition between used and new goods. The traditional “selling
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manufacturer. We also contribute to the durable goods literature by showing how a durable
goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its time consistency problem. Eﬀectively,
this allows the manufacturer to earn the same proﬁts as it would get if it could commit to
prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting have
additional costs, our solution may be the optimal strategy for a durable goods manufacturer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we lay out the basic model.
Section 3 analyzes the problem of coordinating the durables goods distribution channel, and
section 4 explores the role of linear and non-linear contracts. We conclude the paper in section
5.
2M o d e l
In this section, we lay out our assumptions about the product and the players in our analysis
– the manufacturer, the retailer and the consumers. We assume a manufacturer produces a
durable product at a constant marginal cost of production, c>0. We assume that the retailer’s
marginal costs are constant, and set them to zero without further loss of generality. In order to
market this product to consumers, the manufacturer uses a retailer who purchases units from
the manufacturer and sells them to consumers.
The product that is marketed is a durable that provides two periods of service. While the
exact length of product life is not crucial, it is important to allow each unit of the product
to last for more than one period.2 In our analysis, a unit sold in period 1 provides service in
periods 1 and 2. In addition, we assume that once the product is sold, then all units of the
2Assuming the product lasts for two periods is equivalent to assuming that it becomes obsolete after n periods.
It is only important to assume that the product last for a ﬁnite amount of time (Bulow 1982).
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in period 1, the product deteriorates with usage and becomes a used good in period 2. The
extent of deterioration depends on the inherent durability, δ (0 · δ · 1) of the product. That
is, δ represents how well a unit sold in period 1 holds up in period 2, and (1−δ)r e p r e s e n t st h e
extent of deterioration due to usage. If δ = 1, the product does not deteriorate and new units
are identical to used units. If δ = 0, then the product has no durability and it deteriorates fully
after one period of use.
An important assumption of our model is that consumers who purchase the product in
period 1 always have the option of selling their used product in a secondary or used market
in period 2. For example, there are active secondary markets for a variety of products such
as automobiles, airplanes, white goods, etc. We assume that the used market is competitive
and neither the manufacturer nor the retailer have any direct control over this market. As a
consequence, used goods compete against new goods and the extent of competition between
new and used units is directly related to the durability δ. If the product is perfectly durable
(δ = 1), then new and used units are identical and new goods face the strongest competition
from used goods. On the other hand, if the product is a non-durable (i.e., δ = 0), used goods
have no value and there is no secondary market for the product.
Unlike the case of a non-durable that is consumed in an instant, a durable product is
“consumed” over time. In our model, because the product is assumed to provide services for
two periods, then a consumer who purchases a product in period 1 gets two periods of use out
of the product. We derive per-period prices for the product based on consumers’ valuations for
the services provided by the product in a given period. Therefore, consumers who purchase the
product in period 1 pay a total price that is the discounted sum of two per-period prices.
Deﬁne rij as the one-period price in period i of product j,w h e r ei =1 ,2a n dj, can either
be new (n)o ru s e d( u). Similarly, deﬁne qij as the quantity sold in period i of product j.A
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used product in period two, i.e., q2u = q1n. To capture the one period prices of new and used
goods, we use the following inverse demand system:
r1n = α − q1n, (1)
r2n = α − δq2u − q2n, (2)
r2u = δ(α − q2n − q2u), (3)
where α is a positive constant that captures the size of the potential market. We show in the
Appendix that the above demand functions are derived from a well-speciﬁed consumer utility
function. Because there are no used products available in period 1, we do not have an r1u.
Note that as δ increases, used goods deteriorate less and are closer substitutes for new goods;
thus r2u increases and r2n decreases with δ. Similarly, the quantity of used cars (q2u)n e g a t i v e l y
aﬀects the new car price in period 2, r2n.
Equations (1—3) represent the per-period prices for the services delivered in the that period.
Because new products deliver a higher quality of service, their price is also higher, r2n ≥ r2u.
Consumers who purchase the product in period 1 are getting two periods of service from the
product – ﬁrst as a new good and then as a used good. In terms of market prices, this means
that the selling price of the new product in period 1, p1n,s h o u l dr e ﬂect all future service that
the product will provide. Therefore,
p1 = r1n + ρr2u (4)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is a discount factor common to consumers and the ﬁrm.
The manufacturer in our model is assumed to play the role of a Stackelberg leader who
announces a contract to the retailer. Based on this contract, the retailer chooses the number of
units to order and sell on the market. We require that any contract that the manufacturer oﬀers
to the retailer must provide a non-negative proﬁt to the retailer over the two-period horizon.
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which the demand in each period is strictly positive.
3 Integrated Channels
In this section we begin with an analysis of two benchmark cases – one in which the manu-
facturer sells directly to consumers and the other in which the manufacturer rents directly to
consumers. Although both of these results are well established (e.g., Bulow 1982), we brieﬂy
review them in this section because they provide useful benchmarks for our subsequent model
in which we add a retailer in the distribution channel.
3.1 Integrated Seller
We ﬁrst consider the case of an integrated manufacturer that sells directly to consumers. In this
case, the manufacturer chooses a sales quantity at the beginning of each period. To derive the
subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the model recursively. In period two, the manufacturer’s
problem is to maximize proﬁts, π2, by choosing an optimal q2n. That is, the manufacturer
maximizes Π2 =( r2n − c)q2n. This maximization problem yields:
qs∗
2n =
α − c − δq1n
2
. (5)
From Equation (5), note that for any positive level of δ,a st h eﬁrm sells more units in
period 1, it increases the competition from the used market in period 2. Similarly, for any
positive level of q1n, any increase in δ increases the competition from the used market. This
occurs because an increase in δ makes a used product a stronger substitute for the new one.
This creates an incentive for the ﬁrm to reduce its sales quantity in period 2. It is easy to see
that for non-durable goods that are purchased repeatedly by consumers in each period, δ =0
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Given the optimal qs∗
2n, in period 2, the manufacturer maximizes its total discounted proﬁts
in the ﬁrst period by choosing the optimal ﬁrst period quantity, qs∗
1n. That is, it maximizes,
Π1 =( p1n − c)q1n + ρΠs∗
2 by choosing the optimal q1n.3 This yields
qs∗
1n =






[α − c −




The integrated renter rents the product to consumers in each period. In period 1, because there
a r en o“ u s e d ”u n i t s ,t h eﬁrm rents only new ones. However, in period 2, the ﬁrm rents both
new as well as used units carried over from period 1. The integrated renter’s proﬁti np e r i o d2
is given by Π2 = r2uq1n +(r2n −c)q2n.T h eﬁrm maximizes its total proﬁts over the two period
horizon,
Π1 =( r1n − c)q1n + ρΠ2, (7)
by choosing optimal quantities for both periods. This yields:
qr∗
1n =
α − c(1 − δρ)












Because a renter of a durable good does not have a problem with time consistency, it
i sw e l lk n o w nt h a ta ni n t e g r a t e dr e n t e ri sm o r ep r o ﬁt a b l et h a na ni n t e g r a t e ds e l l e r( B u l o w
1982). In particular, the proﬁts of an integrated renter represent the highest possible proﬁts
in the distribution channel. On the other hand, if an integrated seller could credibly commit
to the quantities it would market, then it could replicate the results of an integrated renter.
3Recall that p1n = r1n + ρr2u
11 Desai et al.: Coordinating Channels for Durable Goods
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011It is important to emphasize that this result hinges on the manufacturer’s ability to credibly
commit to these quantities. In other words, if consumers do not believe the manufacturer, then
the results in Equations (8) are not feasible, because consumers anticipate the ﬁrm will renege
on its commitment in period 2. In this event, the ﬁrm’s optimal strategy is given by Equation
(6).
4 Decentralized Channels
Now we consider the case of a manufacturer that has to rely on the services of a retailer.
The retailer purchases the product from the manufacturer and sells it to consumers. Below,
we examine various contracts that the manufacturer can oﬀer to the retailer, beginning with
simple wholesale prices and then moving to two-part tariﬀs.
4.1 Wholesale Price Contract
First, we consider the case where the manufacturer charges a simple wholesale price in each
period. Based upon the wholesale price announced at the beginning of each period, the retailer
chooses the optimal quantity to order and sell on the market. In order to achieve the subgame
perfect equilibrium, we solve the game recursively, beginning with the decisions in period 2.
In period 2, the retailer maximizes proﬁts, πD2 =( r2n − w2)q2n, by choosing an optimal
q2n,w h e r ew2 is the wholesale price in period 2. This yields:
q∗
2n =
α − w2 − δq1n
2
. (9)
Given the retailer’s optimal choice, the manufacturer maximizes its period 2 proﬁts, πM2 =
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2n, by choosing an optimal w2. This yields:
w∗
2 =
(α + c − δq1n)
2
. (10)
In period one, the retailer maximizes its discounted proﬁts,
πD1 =( r1n + ρr2u − w1)q1n + ρπD2, (11)
by choosing an optimal q1n.T h i sy i e l d s :
q∗
1n =
α(8 + 5δρ) − 8w1 +3 cδρ
16 + δρ(16 − 5δ)
.
Given the retailer’s optimal decisions, the manufacturer maximizes its discounted proﬁts,
πM1 =( w1 − c)q∗
1n + ρπM2, (12)
by choosing its optimal w1.T h i sy i e l d s :
w∗
1 =
α[128 + 240δρ− 45δ3ρ2 − 56δ2ρ(1 − 2ρ)] + c
£
128 + 144δρ− 11δ3ρ2 − 8δ2ρ(5 − 2ρ)
¤
32(8 + 8δρ− 3δ2ρ)
. (13)
It is straightforward to show that, as one would expect, a simple wholesale price contract
does not solve the coordination problem for either durables or non-durables. In the following
section, we attempt to solve the coordination problem in a durable goods channel by studying
a variety of two-part tariﬀs.
4.2 Two-Part Tariﬀs
Now we consider the case of a distribution channel in which the manufacturer charges a two-
part tariﬀ consisting of a ﬁxed and a variable fee. The ﬁxed fee is a lump-sum payment and
the variable fee is a constant wholesale price per unit ordered. The standard result from the
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contract, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at marginal cost and extracts all the retailer
proﬁt through the ﬁx e df e e .T h i se n s u r e st h a tt h er e t a i l e rf a c e st h es a m ev a r i a b l ec o s ts t r u c t u r e
as an integrated manufacturer. In this strategy, the manufacturer essentially “sells” the ﬁrm to
the retailer at a ﬁxed fee and the retailer acts as the integrated manufacturer. In this section, we
explore whether such an approach can solve the problem of managing a durable goods channel.
In particular, we look at a series of two-part tariﬀs that explore whether coordination can occur
through selling the ﬁrm to the retailer. We begin with a contract in which the manufacturer
oﬀers per-period two-part tariﬀs in which all wholesale prices are set at the manufacturer’s
marginal cost. Subsequently, we allow wholesale prices to be diﬀerent from marginal cost.
Finally, we explore contracts in which the manufacturer commits to prices ahead of time.
4.2.1 Two-Part Tariﬀ with w1=w2=c
It is well known that a two-part tariﬀ in which the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at its
marginal cost and extracts all the rents from the retailer through a ﬁxed fee coordinates the
channel for a nondurable. In this section we test whether or not such a contract can achieve
the same goal in a distribution channel for a durable product.
We begin by assuming that the wholesale prices are given by w1 = c and w2 = c,a n dt h e
retailer maximizes its period 2 proﬁts,
πD2 =( r2n − c)q2n − F2.




α − c − δq1n
2
.
The manufacturer does not gain from leaving any positive proﬁt for the retailer in period
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The problem in period 1 is solved in a similar manner and is not detailed here. When
wholesale prices are constrained to equal marginal cost, the optimal ﬁxed fees are given by:
F ◦
1 =
[2(α − c)+( α + c)δρ]2






α − c −





This leads to the following proposition:5
Proposition 1 A per-period two-part tariﬀ with wholesale prices set at marginal cost does not
coordinate the durable goods channel.
At ﬁrst blush, it may seem that charging a two-part tariﬀ in each period should coordinate
the channel. However, in the case of durables, this turns out not to be the case. Note that the
manufacturer always has an incentive to choose a second-period ﬁxed fee that extracts all the
second-period rents from the retailer. However, the retailer in period 1 anticipates this move
by the manufacturer in period 2. Therefore, in making the ﬁrst-period quantity decision, the
retailer does not consider any eﬀect of its decision on the outcomes in period 2. As a result,
the retailer ends up choosing a ﬁrst-period quantity that is too high from the manufacturer’s
and channel’s perspectives. In other words, the optimal two-part tariﬀ leaves the retailer with
no stakes in the period 2 outcome, and recognizing this, the retailer acts as a single-period
optimizer in period 1. This is the reason for the sub-optimality of the two-part tariﬀ with
marginal cost pricing.
4We only require that the retailer earns a non-negative proﬁt over the model horizon. Therefore, it is possible
that the manufacturer can leave a negative proﬁt for the retailer in period 2 and a positive proﬁt for the retailer
in period 1 such that the net present value of the two proﬁts is non-negative. It turns out that such a solution
leads to the same outcome as the solution described in here. More details are available from the authors.
5All proofs are in the Appendix.
15 Desai et al.: Coordinating Channels for Durable Goods
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011An interesting aspect of this solution is that even while restricting the wholesale prices to
marginal cost, “selling the ﬁrm” does not emerge as a solution. Under the current form of
contract, selling the ﬁrm emerges as a solution only if the optimal second-period ﬁxed fee were
zero. This, however, is not an equilibrium because we ﬁnd that the second-period ﬁxed fee is
always positive.
An interesting corollary to the above proposition is that the retailer’s period 1 selling quan-
tity is in fact higher than that of an integrated manufacturer. In traditional channel coor-
dination settings, because of the double marginalization problem, the retailer sells too low a
quantity; hence the optimal two-part tariﬀ coordinates the system by increasing the quantities
to the optimal amount. What we discover in our setting is that a two-part tariﬀ with marginal
cost pricing leads the retailer to sell too much! Proposition 1 highlights why the channel co-
ordination problem is diﬀerent in the durable goods markets. In addition, this suggests that
there are two possible approaches for the manufacturer to reach an equilibrium solution. The
ﬁrst solution is to charge a wholesale price above the marginal cost – a higher wholesale price
can potentially bring down quantities to the appropriate level. The other possible solution is
not to extract all the proﬁts from the retailer in period 2, so that the retailer has some stakes
in period 2 outcome. We consider both these possibilities next.
4.2.2 General Two-Part Tariﬀ Contract
Now we consider the optimal two-part tariﬀ without imposing any restrictions on the variable
fee. As in the previous cases considered, we solve this model recursively, beginning with the
retailer’s problem in period 2. The retailer maximizes period 2 proﬁts,
πD2 =( r2n − w2)q2n − F2,
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q∗∗
2n =
α − w2 − δq1n
2
.
Based upon this choice, the manufacturer maximizes its proﬁts in period 2,
πM2 =( w2 − c)q2n + F2,
by choosing the optimal w2 and F2. This yields: w∗∗
2 = c and, as before, the manufacturer
chooses F2 such that the retailer earns no rents in period 2, π∗∗
D2 = 0. The problem in period 1
is solved in a similar manner and is not detailed here. The period 1 wholesale price and ﬁxed









8+4 δρ+ δ3ρ2 − 4δ2ρ(1 + ρ)
¤








(4 + 4δρ− 3δ2ρ)2 . (16)
Note that for any δ > 0, the optimal wholesale price in period 1 is greater than marginal
cost, w∗∗
1 >c .W h e nδ = 0, then the product we are considering is a non-durable, and we get
the standard result of marginal cost pricing, w∗∗
1 = c.
The retailer’s optimal quantities are given by:
q∗∗
1n =







4 − 3δ2ρ − 2δ (1 − 2ρ)
¤
− c[4 − 2δ(1 − 2ρ) − δ2ρ]
2(4 + 4δρ− 3δ2ρ)
. (18)
Comparing the quantities in Equations (17-18) with the quantities in Equation (6), it is
clear that the above contract induces the retailer to choose coordinated quantities.
Proposition 2 There exists a two part tariﬀ that coordinates the distribution channel. In this
contract:
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1 ≥ c in the ﬁrst period and w∗∗
2 = c in the second period.
• The manufacturer’s proﬁts are equal to those of an integrated manufacturer selling directly
to consumers.
Thus, similar to the case of non-durables, there exists a two-part tariﬀ that can coordinate
the distribution channel for a durable product. However, there is an important diﬀerence – the
manufacturer sells at marginal cost only in period 2; in period 1, it sells strictly above marginal
cost. The rationale for setting wholesale price above marginal cost in period 1 can be understood
from our discussion in the previous section. In particular, note that when the manufacturer sets
the ﬁrst-period wholesale price at marginal cost, the retailer’s optimal sales quantity in period 1
is higher than the coordinated quantity. Therefore, the manufacturer raises its wholesale price
above its marginal cost, eﬀectively increasing the retailer’s per-unit costs and, in turn, inducing
it to choose a lower sales quantity. Although this two-part tariﬀ eﬀectively coordinates the
distribution channel to the level of an integrated seller, the distribution channel as a whole
still suﬀers from the same time-consistency problem that an integrated seller of a durable good
would face.
4.2.3 Fixed Fee Commitment
Proposition 1 shows that when the manufacturer extracts all the retailer’s proﬁts in period 2,
the retailer has no stake in the outcome of period 2. As a result, it ignores the inter-temporal
linkages, and sells more than what the manufacturer would want it to. Earlier we showed how
selling above marginal cost is a solution to this problem. Below we consider another possible
solution – by not extracting all the proﬁts from the retailer in period 2, the manufacturer
gives the retailer a stake in the outcome in period 2. If the manufacturer has to choose the
period 2 ﬁxed fee, F2, at the end of period 1, then its incentives are to choose F2 to extract
all the period 2 proﬁt from the retailer. Therefore, in period 1 the retailer will anticipate this
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way the manufacturer can convince the retailer that it will not extract all the retailer proﬁts in
p e r i o d2i st oc o m m i tt oas p e c i ﬁcv a l u eo fF2 at the beginning of period 1, before the retailer
chooses the ﬁrst-period quantity. In other words, the manufacturer needs to oﬀer a contract
that speciﬁes ﬁxed fees for both periods at the beginning of period 1. It is easy to see that this
approach is equivalent to charging a single ﬁxed fee. Note that we see similar arrangements in
practice in which retailers pay a one-time ﬁxed (lump sum) fee to obtain the rights to sell a
manufacturer’s products and then pay per-unit wholesale fees for the products that they buy.
Our speciﬁc interest in analyzing this type of contract is to see if the equilibrium wholesale
prices are equal to the marginal cost. The reason is that if the equilibrium solution involves
the manufacturer setting the wholesale prices at marginal cost, then this solution is equivalent
to one where the manufacturer simply sells the ﬁr mt ot h er e t a i l e ra tap r i c ee q u a lt ot h eﬁxed
fee. This leads to the following:
Proposition 3 When the manufacturer commits to a ﬁxed fee, it charges wholesale prices above
marginal cost in both periods.
Proposition 3 shows that even when the manufacturer can commit to ﬁxed prices, selling
the ﬁrm is not an equilibrium outcome. The manufacturer who sells through a retailer charges
wholesale prices above marginal cost in both periods. The reason is that once the manufacturer
sets the ﬁxed fee at the beginning of period, it gains from charging a wholesale price above the
marginal cost in period 2. As a result, the period 1 wholesale price is also above marginal cost.
However, this suggests that if the manufacturer can commit to both – the wholesale prices
and ﬁxed fees – for both periods at the beginning of period 1, then it can better alleviate the
channel coordination problem. We discuss such a contract next.
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In this case, we consider the case of a manufacturer who can write a contract in period 1 that
covers both periods. In particular, the manufacturer announces a ﬁxed fee, F, and wholesale
prices, w1 and w2, at the beginning of period 1. Note that charging one ﬁxed fee for both
p e r i o d sv e r s u sc h a r g i n gt w od i ﬀerent ﬁxed fees – one for each period – does not make any
diﬀerence in the current contract. It is straightforward to see that the single ﬁxed fee in the
current contract can be broken up into two ﬁxed fees without changing the outcome.
T h eg a m ei ss o l v e dr e c u r s i v e l yb yﬁrst solving the retailer’s problem in period 2, followed
by its problem in period 1. The retailer’s problem is solved recursively because the retailer is
not able to credibly commit to future prices to the market as a whole. On the other hand, the
manufacturer can make a credible price commitment to a single retailer. Given the retailer’s
optimal choices, the manufacturer maximizes its total proﬁts by choosing the optimal contract
–t h eﬁxed fee and both wholesale prices.
The retailer’s optimal quantities are:
q∗∗∗∗
1n =





α(1 − δ)(1+δρ) − c[1 − δ (1 − ρ)]
2+2 δρ− 2δ2ρ
. (20)
Comparing Equations (19-20) with Equation (8), it is clear that the current contract results
in the same quantities that an integrated renter would choose and results in the highest proﬁts
for the distribution channel.
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2Acα + Bc2 + Dα2
8[1 + δρ(1 − δ)]2 ,
where A,B,D are as given in the Appendix.
It is easy to see that w∗∗∗∗
1 ≥ c and w∗∗∗∗
2 ≥ c with the equalities holding only for δ = 0 (the
product is non-durable). Thus, when δ = 0, our results reduce to the traditional marginal cost
pricing results for non-durable manufacturers.
Proposition 4 In a distribution channel that consists of a durable product manufacturer who
sells to a retailer who sells to consumers, a two-part tariﬀ with commitment coordinates the
distribution channel and achieves the highest level of proﬁts. The optimal wholesale price in
this contract is above marginal cost in each period.
By committing not only to a speciﬁc ﬁx e df e eb u ta l s ot os p e c i ﬁc wholesale prices, the
manufacturer induces the selling retailer to choose the same quantities as an integrated renter.
In the absence of the retailer, an integrated seller would not be able to choose these quantities
without making credible commitments to individual consumers. It is often the case that a
commitment to a retailer is less costly, more credible and ultimately more enforceable than
commitments to numerous individual consumers. In such cases, having a retailer helps the
manufacturer solve the time consistency problem and allows it to earn greater proﬁts than it
w o u l di fi tw e r ea ni n t e g r a t e ds e l l e r .
Interestingly, in non-durable goods settings, the best that a decentralized manufacturer can
do is obtain the proﬁts of an integrated manufacturer. On the other hand, a durable goods
seller can do even better by selling through a retailer – it can earn the same proﬁts as an
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then it may be the case that selling through a retailer may even dominate renting directly to
consumers.
Finally, we note that in this type of contract also, selling the ﬁrm to the retailer is a feasible
solution. However, it doesn’t turn out to be the equilibrium outcome.
5 Conclusions
This paper introduces the problem of managing a channel for a durable good. This is a complex
problem because not only does the manufacturer have to deal with the problem of coordination
but also the problem of time-consistency. The problem of coordination arises because of the
need to align the manufacturer’s and retailer’s goals. On the other hand, the time-consistency
problem arises because of consumers beliefs that future market prices of the durable will fall.
For a manufacturer that can only sell its product to consumers, the only way out of this
problem is to make a commitment not to lower prices in the future. While a commitment
such as this is certainly possible – and it may even be honored by a ﬁrm that cares about
its reputation – the fact remains that, ex post it is not time-consistent and the manufacturer
has an incentive to deviate from its ex ante commitment. In addition, it is diﬃcult, although
not impossible, for a ﬁrm to make numerous commitments to individual consumers in the
market. Similarly, although renting the product eliminates the problem of time-consistency, it
suﬀers from other problems such as consumer moral hazard and the need to market the product
multiple times in its lifetime. In this paper, we oﬀer a simpler way out of this problem: Make
a price commitment with a two-part tariﬀ to a retailer. The beauty of this contract is that
it solves not only the coordination problem but also the retailer’s time-consistency problem.
More importantly, the price commitment is also credible, because it is made through a contract
between a manufacturer and a retailer. Business-to-business contracts such as this are readily
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And if we consider additional costs of renting or leasing, selling can be more proﬁtable. This
also oﬀers another explanation for why leasing is not as widespread as theoretical predictions
would suggest.
We also derive interesting insights about the channel coordination problem for a durable
goods manufacturer. We show that under certain conditions, a retailer may sell more than
an integrated manufacturer. To induce the retailer to sell fewer quantities of the durable, the
wholesale price exceeds the manufacturer’s marginal cost. We also show that a manufacturer
can gain by committing to future terms of trade with the retailer. The reason is that the channel
coordination problem is worsened by the manufacturer’s incentives to act opportunistically in
the future. Once the retailer makes his ﬁrst-period decisions, the manufacturer has incentives
to extract all the proﬁts from the retailer in period two. By making a contractual commitment
not to act in such a way, the manufacturer makes the channel coordination task easier.
The results in this paper are important in establishing how ﬁrms can coordinate the chan-
nels for durable products. We ﬁnd that the speciﬁcs of the contract vary with the inherent
durability of the product and the extent of competition posed by the secondary market. Our
analysis has implications for any durable product category in which manufacturers sell through
intermediaries. By incorporating the strategic impact of consumer strategies in a multi-period
durable-goods setting, we are able to add insights to the channels literature. In particular,
we argue that product durability plays a crucial role in manufacturer relationships with retail-
ers. We acknowledge that we have treated durability as an exogenous variable and assumed
that there is no uncertainty about demand. Clearly manufacturers have some control over the
durability that they build into a product and they often face uncertain demand. We intend to
explore both these avenues in future research.
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Derivation of Demand Functions
We model consumers who are heterogeneous in their valuations of the durable good. In this
vertical diﬀerentiation model, we use the parameter φ ∈ (0,α) to represent a consumer’s val-
uation of the per-period service provided by a new product. Note that a consumer with a
higher φ values the product more than a consumer with a lower φ. Finally, we assume that φ
is distributed uniformly in the interval [0,1] and, in any period, each consumer uses at most
one product. Recall from our discussion earlier that the product deteriorates as it ages. Thus,
a consumer’s valuation of the per-period services from a used product are δφ.
The net utility from using a product for a single period is:
U = δmφ − r (A1)
where m is an indicator variable such that m = 0 if the product is new and m =1i ft h ep r o d u c t
is used, and r is the one-period price.
In equilibrium, consumers choose one of the following four strategies: (i) buy a new product
in period 1 and, in period 2, sell their used product and buy a new product (BB); (ii) buy a new
product in the ﬁrst period and hold onto it in the second period (BH); (iii) remain inactive in
period 1 and buy a used product in period 2 (IU); and (iv) be inactive in both periods (II). In
terms of consumer utility, it can be shown that if all four strategies are observed in equilibrium,
then consumers who follow a BB strategy value the product more (i.e., have a higher φ)t h a n
consumers who follow a BH strategy, who value it more than consumers who follow an IU
strategy, who value it more than consumers who follow an II strategy.
F i r s tc o n s i d e rt h ec o n s u m e r si np e r i o d2 .F o l l o w i n gt h en o t a t i o ni nt h et e x t ,l e tq1n(= q2u)
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valuation consumer who adopts an IU strategy. This consumer is located at a point φ3 =
α−q1n−q2n on the [0,α] line and has to be indiﬀerent between following an IU and an II strategy.
From Equation (A1), this consumer’s net utility from an IU strategy is δ(α − q1n − q2n) − r2u,
and the utility from following an II strategy is zero. Equating these two utilities, we get the
following demand for used products:
r2u = δ(α − q2u − q2n). (A2)
Now consider the lowest valuation consumer who adopts a BB strategy. This consumer is
located at a point φ1 = α − q2n and has to be indiﬀerent between BB and BH strategies. In
period 2, the net utility from a BB strategy is α − q2n − r2n + r2u.6 Similarly, the net utility
from holding onto the product in period 2 is δ(α − q2n). Equating these two utilities yields the
one-period price for new products in period 2:
r2n = α − q2n − δq2u. (A3)
Now consider the consumers in period 1 and assume that they are making a decision about
using the services of the product for a single period. The last consumer who uses a product in
period 1 is located at a point α − q1n. This consumer has to be indiﬀerent between using this
product for one period and staying out of the market in this period. Equating the utilities from
these two strategies yields the one-period price in period 1:
r1n = α − q1n. (A4)
Now consider the two-period horizon when consumers are buying the product in period 1.
At this stage, the marginal consumer (located at α−q1n) should be indiﬀerent between following
6Recall that a BB strategy means that the consumer buys a new product in period 1, sells it at a price r2u
in period 2 and buys another new product at a price of r2n.
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continue using the same product in period 2, or buy nothing now and wait until period 2 to
buy a used product. Equating the net utilities of the BH and IU strategies of this consumer
implies that
α − q1n − p1n + ρ[δ(α − q1n)] = ρ[δ(α − q1n) − r2u].
This yields the selling price of the product in period 1:
p1n = r1n + ρr2u. (A5)
Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1
An integrated seller’s proﬁt, Πs,i sg i v e nb y :
Πs =
4(α − c)2 +4 ρ(α − c)(α + c(−1+2 δ)) + δρ2(4(α − c)2 + δ(c2 +6 cα − 3α2))
16 + 4δρ(4 − 3δ)
. (A6)
A decentralized seller’s proﬁt when charging a two-part tariﬀ with w1 = w2 = c, Π◦,i sg i v e n
by
Π◦ =
(2α − 2c − ρδ(c + α))2





α − c −





In addition, the diﬀerence
Πs − Π◦ =
δ2ρ2[c(−4+δ(2 − 4ρ)+δ2ρ)+α(4 − 3δ2ρ + δ(−2+4 ρ))]2
16(2 + 2δρ− δ2ρ)2(4 + 4δρ − 3δ2ρ)
> 0. (A8)
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2 } contract results in
coordinated selling quantities. The manufacturer’s proﬁt, Π∗∗,i sg i v e nb y ,
Π∗∗ =
4(α − c)2 +4 ρ(α − c)(α + c(−1+2 δ)) + δρ2(4(α − c)2 +( c2 +6 cα − 3α2)δ)
16 + 4δρ(4 − 3δ)
= Πs (A9)
and the manufacturer’s margin is given by
w∗∗
1 − c =
δρ[α[4 − 2δ +4 δρ− 3δ2ρ] − c(4 − 2δ +4 δρ− δ2ρ)]
8+2δ (4 − 3δ) ρ
. (A10)
For the second-period sales, q∗∗
2n,t ob ep o s i t i v e ,α >c
4−2δ +(4−δ)ρδ
4−2δ+(4−3δ)ρδ. Therefore, for any
value of δ > 0, w∗∗
1 − c>0.
Proposition 3
The ﬁxed fee and the wholesale prices that the manufacturer charges in equilibrium are given
by:
F∗∗∗ =
256(α − c)2 +1 6 ρ(α − c)G +4 δρ2H + δ2ρ3J




αδρ[8 − δ(4 − 8ρ) − 5δ2ρ]+c[32 + 24δρ+ δ3ρ2 − 2δ2ρ(5 + 4ρ)]






[α + c −
δ[α(8 + 3δρ) − c(8 − 5δρ)]
16 + 16δρ− 7δ2ρ
],
where
G = α[4 + δ (28 − 5δ)] − c[4 − δ (4 + 5δ)],
H = α2 [32 + δ (43 − 15δ)]− 2cα[32 − 5δ (9 − δ)] + c2[32 − δ (69 − 25δ)],
J = α2 (16 − δ)( 4− δ)+c2 [64 − δ (44 − 19δ)] − 2cα[64 − δ (116 − 31δ)].
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w∗∗∗
1 − c = δρ
4( α − c)( 2− δ)+δρ [α (8 − 5δ) − c (8 − δ)]
32 + 2δρ (16 − 7δ)
> 0,
w∗∗∗
2 − c =
1
2
[α − 3c − δ
α (8 + 3δρ ) − c (8 − 5δρ )
16 + δρ(16 − 7δ)
] > 0,
it is clear that the manufacturer does not sell the ﬁrm to the retailer.
Proposition 4















2Acα + Bc2 + Dα2
8[1 + δρ(1 − δ)]2 , (A14)
where
A =( 2+( 2− δ2)ρ +2 δ(2 − 3δ + δ2)ρ2 +2 ( 1− δ)2δ2ρ3,
B =( 2+( 2− 4δ − δ2)ρ +2 δ(2 − 3δ +2 δ2)ρ2 +( 2− δ2)δ2ρ3,
C =( 2+( 2− 2δ − δ2)ρ + δ(4 − 7δ +3 δ2)ρ2 +( 2− 3δ + δ2)δ2ρ3.
The optimal sales quantities are:
q∗∗∗∗
1n =





α(1 − δ)(1+δρ) − c[1 − δ (1 − ρ)]
2+2 δρ− 2δ2ρ
. (A16)
It is easy to see that the selling quantities are identical to the quantities of a monopolist
renter in Equation (8). It can also be shown that the manufacturer’s proﬁt under this contract,
Π∗∗∗∗,
Π∗∗∗∗ =
α2 [1 + (1 − δ) ρ]( 1+δρ )+c2[1 + [1 + δ (−2+ρ)]ρ] − 2cα[1 + (1 − δ) ρ (1 + δρ)]
4+4( 1− δ) δρ
(A17)
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addition, the margins in this case are given by:
w∗∗∗∗
1 − c =
δ2 ρ[α − c (1 − δρ )]
4+4( 1− δ) δρ
, (A18)
w∗∗∗∗
2 − c =
δ [α − c (1 − δρ )]
2+2δρ− 2δ2 ρ
. (A19)
For the ﬁrst-period quantity to be positive, α >c(1 − δρ ). With this restriction, it is easy
to see that w∗∗∗∗
1 >cand w∗∗∗∗
2 >c .
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